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Dementia and the social model of disability: does responsibility to adjust lie with society 
rather than people with dementia? 
 
Christine Milligan and Carol Thomas 
 
In the Winter 2015-16 volume of this journal, Philly Hare set out the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation’s  (JRF) vision for a future in which the UK became a good place for people with a 
diagnosis of dementia to live. In her words, the JRF wanted to, “ensure that people living with 
dementia are more understood, more heard, more included, more connected and more supported” 
(p. 9). Part of the drive toward this goal was to think about how we might change society’s 
thinking and attitudes toward dementia and what an inclusive UK society in the context of 
dementia actually means. One outcome of this goal was the commissioning of a ‘think piece’ by 
the authors of this article about how we might draw on the well-established social model of 
disability to develop this thinking (REF). We discuss the key elements of this think-piece in this 
article, but it is worth noting that this was paralleled by companion paper written by Toby 
Williamson (Mental Health Foundation, 2015), designed to encourage new thinking and debate 
about dementia as a human rights issue. 
 
What is the social model of disability? 
Before applying the social model of disability to dementia, we need to look at what this model 
is, and where it has come from. The social model of disability was first coined by the 
disabled activist and writer, Mike Oliver in the early 1980s in his attempt to capture novel ideas 
about disability, developed by disabled people themselves in the previous decade (Oliver, 
1983).  At its core was the view that disabled people were socially disadvantaged - not so 
much by their impairments - but by the negative responses of those deemed to be non-
disabled. Oliver and his contemporaries thus drew attention to a form of social relationship 
between disabled and non-disabled people predicated on social inequality. This relationship 
makes its presence felt in a number of ways: in interactions between individuals; through rules 
and practices in social institutions (such as schools and hospitals); and in the disabling structure of 
the physical environment including buildings, systems of travel and so forth. This perspective 
contrasted markedly with the dominant biomedical view of the time: that being impaired is 
an abnormality that causes major problems and limitations in the lives of ‘the disabled’. It also 
takes issue with assumptions that disabled people should be pitied because it is their 
damaged bodies and minds that stop them participating in ‘normal’ activities. 
 
Instead, the social model of disability drew attention to the social and physical barriers 
erected by non-disabled people in all social arenas and captured the idea that people with 
physical impairments are a socially oppressed group in modern societies. Before long, those 
with impairments beyond the straightforwardly physical began to question their apparent 
exclusion from this initial formulation of the model. In the 1980s and 1990s, the case was 
made – and won – that people who live with sensory or intellectual/cognitive impairments 
(principally learning difficulty) are also disabled people in that they too experience similar 
forms of exclusion and social barriers (Barnes, 2012). Who counts as disabled was further 
widened in the 1990s and 2000s to include people with chronic illnesses and mental health 
problems (e.g. Walmsley, 1991; Beresford, 2002).  Hence, the social model of disability can be 
seen to apply to a growing proportion of the population with lifelong, acquired or attributed 
impairments. In 2004, Oliver clarified his original thinking, stating: 
 
…the social model of disability is about nothing more complicated than a clear focus on the 
economic, environmental and cultural barriers encountered by people who are viewed by others 
as having some form of impairment – whether physical, mental or intellectual. The barriers 
disabled people encounter include inaccessible education systems, working environments, 
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inadequate disability benefits, discriminatory health and social support services, inaccessible 
transport, houses and public buildings and amenities, and the devaluing of disabled people through 
negative images in the media – films, television, and newspapers. (Oliver,2004 p.21). 
 
Because of its conceptual simplicity, the social model of disability became a banner headline 
for the Disabled People’s Movement in the UK. Indeed, from the 1980s onwards, it has 
proven an extremely effective tool in campaigns for disability rights (Campbell and Oliver, 
1996). Legislative achievements of particular note include the Disability Discrimination Acts 
(1995, 2005), the report by the last Labour Government Improving the Life Chances of 
Disabled People (Cabinet Office, 2004), and the introduction of financial arrangements 
designed to facilitate independent living in the 1990s – namely direct payments and personal 
budgets (Pearson, 2012). Evidence for the significance of these developments is clearly 
articulated in pronouncements by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), 
which laid innovative conceptual foundations for the 2010 Equality Act and the follow-up 
Equality Duty, now in force in England, Scotland and Wales. 
 
Given this background and history, it is unsurprising that a small, but growing, number of 
researchers and activists should begin to think about how the social model of disability 
might also apply to people with dementia. Here, the impairments and impairment effects 
associated with dementia are viewed as foundations upon which social barriers are erected 
by non-disabled people – whether purposively, or from lack of understanding and 
knowledge. Adopting the social model of disability has encouraged researchers to look more 
closely at the everyday experiences and perspectives of people with dementia (Proctor, 2001; 
Blackman et al., 2003; Dorenlot, 2005; Beattie et al., 2005; Davis et al., 2009; Brittain et al., 
2010; Boyle, 2014). What is disappointing, however, is not only the relatively small number 
of researchers that have taken this approach, but the peripheral nature of their work within 
disability studies. The latter perhaps arises from two weaknesses of note in disability studies 
in the last 40 years: firstly, the tendency to ignore or sideline older people and their 
particular social interests (Priestley, 2003); and secondly, the failure to understand and take 
account of the needs and interests of younger people (under 65 years old) with dementia. 
This has been compounded by the tendency of many gerontologists, psychologists and 
social scientists to view dementia through a largely biomedical lens until relatively 
recently. 
 
There are however a few key researchers who have adopted more radical perspectives that 
have been influential in shaping our thinking about dementia. Tom Kitwood’s (1997) ideas 
about personhood, for example, insist that we look at, and recognize, ‘the person with 
dementia’ and not focus on ‘the person with dementia’. This kind of approach asserts that 
while we cannot escape the fact that an individual has dementia, and that this will impact on 
how they act and respond to people and things and on what they can and cannot do, the 
individual is not defined by having dementia. In other words, Kitwood’s concept of 
personhood reminds us that people with dementia are still thinking and feeling individuals, 
who have different identities, personal histories, experiences, likes and dislikes. This 
emphasizes the need to respect, value and celebrate what individuals can do rather than define 
them by their dementia; doing the latter simply reinforces the medicalization of that 
individual, relegating them to ‘demented body’ status. 
 
Those commentators who have applied the social model of disability to dementia have 
identified both the presence and operation of social barriers in the lives of people living with 
dementia (e.g. Blackman et al., 2003; Dorenlot, 2005; Beattie et al., 2005; Davis et al., 2009; 
Brittain et al., 2010). There are many different forms of dementia with impairment effects 
that manifest in different ways for different people. This means that, especially in the 
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early, middle or late stages of dementia, the social barriers in evidence vary in the 
profundity of their disabling consequences. Put another way, impairment effects and 
disablism interact, with differential outcomes. 
 
In Table 1 we set out some examples of social barriers that can be experienced by people with 
dementia, whilst in Table 2  we provide examples of barriers that can become embedded in 
institutional and collective practices: 
 
Table 1: Individual attitudinal and behavioural barriers 
 
• lack of understanding of the impairment effects that come with the stages of dementia on the part of 
non-disabled people (e.g. formal and informal carers, family members, general public, young people); 
• lack of sympathy and tolerance on the part of some non-disabled people; 
• failure to recognise the practical difficulties faced by people with dementia (e.g. difficulty 
recognising places and people, way-finding, locating items) – especially in middle and late stages of 
dementia; 
• failure to understand how easy it is for anxiety, fear and uncertainty to take hold in the minds of 
people with dementia, e.g. in unfamiliar surroundings and settings; 
• failure to find ways to communicate with people with dementia, especially where spoken language 
is minimal or absent; 
• failure to recognise and respond to the non-verbal ways that people with dementia use to try to 
communicate; 
• misrecognition and misunderstanding of behaviours and expressions displayed by people with dementia 
– e.g. these may be wrongly attributed, in an ageist fashion, to ‘just being old’; 
• treating people with dementia as passive and dependent. Failing to ask what they want, how they feel, 
what would help to improve things in their lives etc.   
• cruelty, violence and abuse directed at people with dementia; 




Table 2: Barriers that become embedded in institutional and collective practices 
 
• failure to design or adapt items, interiors, buildings, and external environments like streets and gardens, 
to support people with dementia enabling them to remain active, engaged and comfortable. This 
requires consultation with users, careful planning, flexibility and the creative use of technology; 
• denial of choice, self-determination and citizenship rights (e.g. around  
• failure to help get an early diagnosis of dementia because of the social stigma and fear attached to it; 
• weaknesses and failures in medical treatments (e.g. inappropriate use of neuroleptic drugs), poor health 
and social care systems – statutory and voluntary; 
• failure by some services to support the needs of family and other informal carers of people with 
dementia; 
• stigmatising and degrading images and representations of people with dementia in the media and wider 
culture (newspapers, film, television, theatre, art, literature etc); 
• inadequate or absent state legislation and official policies in the interests of people with dementia. 
• food, expressions of sexuality, lifestyle. 
 
A further hallmark of the social model of disability is that that disabled people should have every 
opportunity to be self-determining (Campbell and Oliver, 1996). This means that their 
voices, however expressed, should be heard and facilitated. The empowerment and 
involvement of people living with dementia in determining their own life circumstances and 
choices should be paramount, and advocacy should respect this starting point. It follows that 
despite the many challenges presented by dementia and its impairment effects, non-disabled 
people need to find innovative and imaginative ways to make rights a reality for people with 
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Adding theoretical weight to the social model perspective 
 
Applying the social model of disability to dementia has certainly been an innovative and 
informative move, but there are inevitable limitations, because the social model is not a theory 
of disability. Mike Oliver and other leading proponents of the social model (e.g. Finkelstein, 
2001) have made this point repeatedly. So, while the social model of disability serves as a 
powerful banner headline for campaigns and as an effective framework for identifying social 
barriers, it does not theorise disability. So whilst it is an effective starting point, it lacks the 
explanatory power of theory. That is, we need to be able to explain why social barriers come 
into existence in the lives of people who have types of impairment – including dementia. 
 
Disablism 
In essence, then, the key question is: Why is it that the social relationship between people 
with and without impairments is one that involves the social oppression of the former by the 
latter? This is a very difficult question to answer – as are the parallel questions in older 
branches of equality and diversity studies: why does sexism exist? Why racism? Why 
homophobia? These observations suggest that the study of dementia and disability require us to 
pay attention to some of the theoretical work underway within disability studies. At this point , it 
is perhaps useful to introduce and define the concept of disablism – because this attempts to 
capture the social relationship that underpins social barriers. Following Thomas (2010, 
p.37) disablism: 
 
refers to the social imposition of avoidable restrictions on the life activities, aspirations and 
psycho-emotional well-being of people categorised as ‘impaired’ by those deemed ‘normal’. 
Disablism is social-relational in character and constitutes a form of social oppression in 
contemporary society... As well as being enacted in person-to-person interactions, disablism may 
manifest itself in institutionalised and other socio-structural forms. 
 
The interaction of disablism and ageism is of particular relevance to our discussion. For 
example, impairment effects in early stage dementia often include short-term memory loss 
and difficulty making decisions, but these can also be attributed to ‘just being old’ in a 
society imbued with ageist attitudes. For many people with dementia there is a twofold 
discrimination underway – one of ageism and one of disablist stigma attached to behaviours 
that appear to signal mental illness. An older person is often stereotyped and reduced to an 
ageing body that is devoid of sex, gender, class, cultural knowledge etc., and this can be 
reinforced by staff practices and the interior design and layout of institutions such as 
hospitals and residential care settings. How many care homes have double rooms to enable a 
husband and wife to live together? Are same-sex couples even on the radar? Further, with 
the exception of the very few faith-based care homes in the UK, cultural needs are largely 
ignored because the focus is on body care. 
 
For those with dementia who may be less able to vocalise their preferences, needs and 
desires, others often make decisions on behalf of the person with dementia. In doing so, they 
often fail to consider the former’s person-centred needs. Gilleard et al., (2005) however, 
maintain that taking a social model approach to dementia means that those around people 
with dementia should review the impact that they, as ‘non-demented’ people, have on 
others; reconsider the value of hearing and responding to personal experience; and focus on 
abilities rather than losses. 
 
Insights from Materialism and postructuralism 
Writers and researchers in the disability field have turned to a variety of social theories to try 
to find answers to questions about the existence of disablism. As in any other field, different 
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theoretical perspectives provide contrasting explanations of disablism. We summarise the two 
overarching theoretical frameworks in use in disability studies below: 
 
1) Materialist scholars theorise disability and disablism as outcomes of the way basic activities are 
organised in society – especially, but not exclusively, economic activities. Here, the roots of social 
marginalisation and spatial segregation of people with impairments are viewed as being located in the 
historical development of capitalist production and exchange. These developments gave rise to 
social relationships between ‘the normal’ and ‘the impaired’ that systematically disadvantaged and 
disempowered the latter. This laid the foundations for medicalised systems of ‘treatment and care’ 
that subjected disabled people to professional control and enforced dependency, first in institutional 
regimes and later in systems of ‘community care’. These perspectives have lead to a great deal of 
research around the social exclusion of disabled people in all social arenas in the contemporary era.  
 
2) Theories based on ideas about phenomena (idealism) came to prominence in disability studies 
following what is known as the cultural turn in the social sciences in the 1980s more generally. 
The ideas of the social philosopher Foucault and feminist variants have been particularly influential 
(see Corker and Shakespeare, 2002; Tremain, 2005). Here, the cultural, the discursive, and the 
linguistic have assumed pre-eminence in poststructuralist theorisations of disability and 
impairment. Materialist perspectives are dismissed as modernist systems of thought that are 
infused with conceptual dualisms: abnormal/normal, disabled/non- disabled. Unpicking this type 
of dualist thinking comes to the forefront. Many critiques of the social model of disability are 
raised, with a key critique focusing on what commentators see as the model’s 
impairment/disability distinction. This, they argue, merely replicates the problematic 
biology/society dualism. Poststructuralists have interrogated the category ‘impairment’, and set 
about exposing what they see as its entirely socially constructed character.  
 
If we apply these two key theoretical perspectives to the relationship between people with 
dementia and non-demented members of society (i.e. between the disabled and non-disabled), 
we arrive at contrasting explanations of the disabling and social barriers that exist in the lives 
of people with dementia.  
 
In sum, materialist perspectives would highlight how capitalist economies have no use for the 
cognitively impaired, especially if they are old. This is because social value is closely tied to 
the ability to work for wages/salaries (now or in the future); particularly being able to fit into 
economic roles that generate profit. People who cannot work are therefore (in crude terms): 
excluded from the mainstream; warehoused; kept alive using minimal social resources; 
placed under the ‘legitimate’ control of doctors and ‘carers’; kept out of the way of essential 
social activities etc. From this perspective, the category ‘older people with dementia’ is seen to 
combine two disadvantaged groups in capitalist economies – the cognitively impaired and 
the old. This means that old people with dementia are especially vulnerable to disablism. 
 
Poststructuralist perspectives, however, highlight the cultural meanings that attach to particular 
body types and behaviours. The bodies and behaviours of people with dementia carry 
negative cultural meanings in our society – a society that values youth, beauty and celebrity. 
The negative meanings associated with having dementia, especially in its middle and late 
stages, include ‘abnormal’, ‘undesirable’, ‘bizarre’ – and even ‘disgusting’. These cultural 
meanings stem from systems of knowledge (‘discourses’) that become authoritative in 
society. Such authoritative systems of knowledge are those that are specialist and 
influential, and these in turn give social power to those that possess the knowledge. In 
recent centuries, the institutions and groups that have maintained or acquired social power 
via their specialist knowledge include: dominant establishment faiths and churches, judiciary, 
state officials, scientists, and the medical profession. In matters of impairment and disease, it 
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is members of the latter group who hold power; their specialist scientific knowledge about 
dementia and other conditions allows them to define and treat abnormalities of body and 
mind, and to oversee regimens of treatment and ‘care’. Medical ideas then shape thinking in 
other cultural institutions (e.g. the media) and inform knowledge in the wider society. As a 
consequence, everyone starts to share and elaborate ideas about what it means to be ‘demented’ 
‘mentally abnormal’, ‘mad’, and ‘a danger to themselves and others’. The proliferation of these 
stereotypes acts to justify institutionalizing people, controlling ‘difficult behaviours’ through 
medical or pharmaceutical solutions and ignoring what those with dementia say.  
 
So if we look again at the social barriers discussed above, we can see that explanations for the 
existence of these barriers vary, depending on the theoretical stance taken. Perhaps of greater 
significance for this article are the consequences that follow if we begin to think through 
how we might dismantle the barriers. From a materialist stance, change would need to begin 
in the economic realm. Transformations would then follow in other societal domains. From a 
post-structural perspective, however, change needs to begin in the cultural realm, i.e. in the 
realm of ideas and knowledge. Changes are then likely to follow on in other societal domains. 
 
Dementia, intersectionality and psycho-emotional disablism 
Two further concepts, intersectionality and psycho-emotional disablism, are worth 
discussing in relation to contemporary thinking within disability studies. We introduce these 
ideas because they are particularly helpful in thinking through the social features of living 
with dementia. 
 
Intersectionality highlights the overlapping par ts  of our identities, for example, gender, 
ethnicity, sexuality, age and social class (e.g. Stienestra, 2012; Walby et al, 2012). This is 
important because it reminds us that people are not homogenous and cannot simply be grouped 
together by a single characteristic, such as disability or age. When looking at individuals’ 
biographies, it is important to take account of how issues of social and cultural diversity, 
multiple inequality and other characteristics interact to shape people’s life chances and 
capacities to resist disadvantage and social oppression. For example, it you have middle stage 
dementia and are female, old and ‘poor’ you may be more vulnerable to aspects of disablism 
and other faces of oppression (sexism, ageism etc.) than if you have middle stage dementia 
but are male, under 65 years old and from a professional background. Those from more 
affluent backgrounds are more likely to have access to resources that can protect a person 
with dementia from some of the social barriers listed above. While there is nothing certain 
or automatic about this at the level of the individual, there will be social patterns associated 
with intersectionality that connect with degrees of vulnerability to disablist social barriers at 
early, middle and late stages of dementia. 
 
Psycho-emotional disablism 
Another useful theoretical concept for helping us to understand some of the social barriers 
that confront people with dementia is psycho-emotional disablism (Thomas, 1999). This 
concerns the intended or unintended hurtful words, behaviours and social actions or 
practices of non-disabled people in their inter-personal engagements with people with 
dementia. There are several examples of psycho-emotional disablism listed in Table 1 above; 
one example relates to lack of sympathy and tolerance on the part of some non-disabled 
people. 
 
The presence of psycho-emotional disablism means that in addition to coping with the 
impairment effects that dementia brings, people living with the condition may have to put up 
with insulting behavior and emotional damage inflicted by non-disabled people. This form 
of disablism works along psychological and emotional pathways and can impact negatively 
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on self-esteem, personal confidence, and sense of security. Indeed, disabled people can be 
made to feel worthless, useless, of lesser value, ugly and burdensome (Reeve, 2002, 2006). 
Psycho-emotional disablism can thus place further limits on who people can be by shaping an 
individuals’ sense of ‘self’ and social behaviours. Moreover, impairments may themselves be 
affected in problematic ways by the impact of psycho-emotional disablism. For example, a 
mother whose early stage dementia causes her to be forgetful may have this trait worsened 
by an adult son or daughter who displays frustration and keeps complaining about his/her 
mother’s loss of memory. 
 
Policy and Place  
 
There is currently significant interest in dementia in both the UK. Indeed, the costs of caring 
for an ageing population with ‘high support needs’ looms large  in the minds of governments  and 
policy-makers not just nationally, but internationally. We do not have the space here to 
critically review the significant raft of reports on services and strategy published in recent 
years, but it is informative to look at one authoritative document published in 2012: the 
World Health Organization’s report Dementia: A Public Health Priority. This global report, 
one that is likely to have a significant impact on governments and policy-makers internationally, 
flags up the projected patterns of ageing and dementia across the world: 
 
Prevalence and incidence projections indicate that the number of people with dementia will 
continue to grow, particularly among the oldest old, and countries in demographic transition will 
experience the greatest growth. The total number of people with dementia worldwide in 2010 is 
estimated at 35.6 million and is projected to nearly double every 20 years, to 65.7 million in 2030 
and 115.4 million in 2050. The total number of new cases of dementia each year worldwide is 
nearly 7.7 million, implying one new case every four seconds. (WHO 2012: 2) 
 
It is worthy of note that this report makes only passing reference to recognising the rights of 
people with dementia, and of working to maintain their independence, dignity, identity and 
personhood. Rather, the report frames dementia – and by implication those living with 
dementia – as a social, economic and health burden on society. Passing reference is 
certainly made to addressing widespread fear of dementia, to the stigma attached to 
dementia, and to the need to develop a ‘dementia friendly society’ – but there is little said 
about how this might be actively achieved. Hope is raised when reference is made to the 
relevance of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities 
(CRPD, 2006) but, overall, the report takes a medicalised approach to dementia that is 
couched in terms of disease burden, treatment, risk, service provision and the needs of 
carers. From a disability rights perspective, the report leaves the reader with a disappointing 
sense of déjà vu. 
 
Dementia in place  
As e have noted, adapting the social model of disability and anti-disablist thinking to people 
with dementia requires us to consider not just the social and institutional disadvantage that 
those with dementia can experience, but also the ways in which this is played out through the 
everyday places they inhabit. 
 
Those with dementia can lose their sense of time and space, making formerly familiar places 
unfamiliar and frightening, for example wandering through known streets at night. A 
standard institutionalised response to these impairment effects is to view them as ‘risky 
behaviours’, the ‘treatment’ for which is confinement to the home or a residential setting 
unless accompanied by a ‘responsible adult’. Of course, it would be dangerous to place 
vulnerable people in potentially harmful situations, but an anti-discriminatory perspective 
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points instead to the need to develop accepting communities (Beresford et al., 2011). This 
challenge has more recently been taken up through the Dementia Friendly Communities 
initiative – spearheaded by the Alzheimer’s Society and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation in 
2012. This initiative is designed to work collaboratively with people with dementia and key 
partners to improve inclusion and quality of life for those living with dementia. A key vision 
of this strategy is that it will support the development of enabling environments, so people 
within these communities will better understand, and be supportive of, people with 
dementia. The overall aim is to enhance inclusion and facilitate the ability of those with 
dementia to achieve greater independence, choice and control over their lives. 
 
This approach was originally developed to counter the exclusion of people stigmatised by 
poor mental health. This not only required us to develop a greater understanding of the 
relationship between the individual and the wider community, but also required us to think 
about how society judges the value of individuals and responds to mental ill-health. It means 
we need to think about how ‘risk’ should be defined, and what is meant and understood by the 
participation and empowerment of individuals within a community. Understanding and 
valuing difference can only be resolved through the engagement of all involved. 
 
With regard to dementia, these practices are based not just on a wider understanding of the 
changing behaviour patterns that occur with dementia but on developing caring 
communities that are supportive and accepting of social difference. For example, knowing 
that ‘Mrs Smith’ has dementia and may be confused about time and space means that we 
recognise the challenges she faces and watch out for her, rather than viewing her behaviour 
as somehow deviant or abnormal and her family as somehow failing in their duty to care. 
Moreover, it means working out ways of helping her to avoid potential dangers, or 
recognising that she may need support getting to where she wants to go. 
 
Developments in technology – such as personalised tracking devices - may enable people 
with dementia and their carers to identify ‘safe spaces’ within the community. A feeling of 
safety in particular places allows a person with dementia to move around comfortably, 
enabling them to retain a sense of independence that may otherwise be denied (Milligan, 
2009). Critically, however, these technologies rely on local networks of support to be 
effective (Roberts et al., 2012). In other words, they rely on having local family or members 
of the community who are willing and able to respond when an alarm is triggered. So an 
accepting community becomes one that recognises the challenges and is willing to support 
this kind of innovation. 
 
Where care and support for people with dementia takes place, and the nature of those 
places, is also important. The short-term memory loss associated with dementia means that 
new and unfamiliar places can add to the confusion already experienced by a person with 
dementia. Research has already demonstrated that respite care in residential settings can be problematic in this respect.. 
Supporting those with dementia to stay within their own homes for as long as possible is key 
to helping them to maintain a sense of self and identity. The presence of familiar objects 
within the home – private possessions, photographs and so on – represents what Augè 
(1995) referred to as ‘anthropological space’, where the long-term memory provides a sense 
of safety; familiar visual cues can help the individual with dementia to more successfully 
negotiate that space, so extending their ability to self-help (Milligan, 2003). As a visual 
manifestation of a person’s identity and personhood, the home places limits on the extent to 
which an individual can be objectified and de-personalised – something that often happens 
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We have aimed in this article to illustrate how applying the social model of disability to dementia can 
provides some important insights and observations that might help us rethink our approach to 
dementia. Light is also thrown on the way that disablism overlaps with ageism in society, 
and on how space and place acquire special relevance. Attention has also been drawn to how 
different theoretical perspectives can be drawn upon to help explain the social barriers highlighted by 
the social model of disability and how this has relevance for understanding the exclusionary physical, social and 
emotional barriers experienced by people with dementia. Our  paper sets out approaches to dementia that 
are at odds with conventional thinking in official and medical  circles. We hope that this will 
stimulate debate about new ways forward in both understanding and meeting the needs of 
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